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U topianism has been an important characteristic of the digital revo-
lution from the git-go: from its roots in 
counterculture to its decentralised struc-
ture, and from its early adoption primarily 
in university settings and its anti-corporal 
attitude up and until the beginning of the 
1990s, the movement has had its fair share 
of utopians outdoing each other in their 
claims for the future of the internet. There 
was an important anti-elitist element in all 
this, spurred on by the absence of hierar-
chy in the network. Therefore, the claims 
pertaining to democracy made intuitive 
sense. However, since the early 90s many 
things have changed, and the internet 
has taken turns that nobody back then 
had predicted. It has drastically changed 
from anti-corporate to a web dominated 
by capitalist ventures. Before expounding 
upon the problems of the internet as it 
stands now concerning democracy, it will 
be helpful to repeat some of those early 
claims here. Al Gore, for instance, as Vice 
President of the United States in 1994, 
announced:
The Global Information Infra-
structure will not only be a meta-
phor for a functioning democracy, 
it will in fact promote the func-
tioning of democracy by greatly 
enhancing the participation of 
citizens in decision-making. And 
it will greatly promote the ability 
of nations to cooperate with each 
other. I see a new Athenian Age 
of democracy forged in the fora 
the GII will create.1 
This parallel to Athenian democracy has 
been a popular one from the start. It also 
pops up in a 1999 report by the European 
Information Society, who claims that the 
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new information technologies will usher in 
‘the perfect information arena, the agora 
of Ancient Greece, a meeting place where 
citizens could go to be fully informed and 
to participate directly, with no intermedi-
ary, in the government of the city.’2 Kevin 
Kelly, of Wired Magazine, pronounced that 
‘the internet revives Thomas Jefferson’s3 
200-year-old dream of thinking individu-
als self-actualising a democracy’.4 Perhaps 
most famously, Time Magazine chimed in 
by announcing ‘You’ as their coveted per-
son of the year in 2006, stating that it was 
all about ‘the many wresting power from 
the few’, and pronouncing not the World 
Wide Web as invented by Tim Berners-Lee 
in 1991, but Web 2.0, a revolution.
What all these claims have in com-
mon, is a firm belief in the willingness 
of the people to fulfil their latent politi-
cal potential. They suggest that up until 
now, well-intentioned citizens have been 
silenced by malignant elite forces, and that 
the internet will offer them direct influence 
on how they are governed. As this essay 
will make clear, there is no evidence for 
this. For instance, one of the more popular 
new initiatives in the digital era has been 
to offer citizens the chance to contact their 
representative by email or some other elec-
tronic way. This is not necessarily a new 
possibility. In the past, it was also possible 
to write to your representative, to make 
your voice heard. While the threshold of 
sending an e-mail might be lower, this can 
hardly constitute a revolution.
One of the problems in the claims made 
above might be the very word democracy, 
which over the years has become a vague 
concept, meaning vastly different things to 
different people. We will look at this 
definition first.
Defining democracy
If we want to discuss ‘democratisation’, 
it is of course necessary to first define it. 
Over the years, many different definitions 
have been given. A discussion of these is 
beyond the scope of this essay. I will there-
fore focus on the different definitions that 
the advocates of digital democracy allow. 
Dahlberg outlines four major ‘positions’ 
through which the extension of digital 
democracy is seen. These are liberal- 
individualist, deliberative, counter-publics 
and autonomist Marxist. I will focus on 
the first two positions, since these are the 
most discussed, and they are often prob-
lematically, though interestingly, confused, 
whereas the latter two are somewhat more 
marginalised, concerning, among other 
things, the potential for activism and the 
construction of a completely new society.
The first position, the liberal-individu-
alist position, is by far the most common 
and popular of these four. It considers 
the internet as a resource or tool, a place 
where citizens can educate and inform 
themselves, free of censorship. This also 
includes interaction with representatives, 
petitions, and aggregational tools, etc. This 
position considers the citizen as a rational 
The Internet is considered 
as a resource or tool, 
a place where citizens 
can educate 
and inform themselves, 
free of censorship
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individual actively seeking out information 
to inform himself. Generally speaking, it 
sees the extension of democracy by digital 
means as an extension of the communi-
cational possibilities between politicians 
and citizens, focusing on interaction. This 
is also the position that has most readily 
been adopted by governments, making 
all state documents available and easily 
accessible online, and facilitating chan-






on the other hand, 
consider the digital 
medium as a new 
public sphere for 
discussion and 
deliberation. Like the liberal-individualists, 
they presuppose the citizen as a ratio-
nal individual actively aiming to inform 
himself, but theirs is a more participatory 
approach, suggesting discussion between 
individuals can create wholly new posi-
tions instead of simply allowing the indi-
vidual to make up his mind concerning 
the traditional voices of politics. Dalhberg 
has formulated six criteria to which a 
democracy should adhere in order to be 
deliberative: autonomy from state and eco-
nomic power; reason rather than assertion; 
reflexivity; ideal role taking; sincerity; and 
discursive inclusion and equality. Though 
most of these are subjective and difficult 
to test, the first and the last are relevant, 
assayable, and particularly interesting. 
Autonomy from state and economic power 
was one of the prime feats with which 
the internet was initially heralded, but the 
increasing tendency of all internet traffic to 
run through large corporate companies has 
made this criterium more and more 
problematic. This will be discussed in 
section three. The last criterium, discur-
sive inclusion and equality, brings up the 
problem of the digital divide to which we 
will return in section two.7 
The distinction drawn above between 
interaction and participation is also made 
in Carpentier. Basing himself on audience 




which audiences can 
be divided. As pointed 
out above, both the 
liberal-individualist and 
deliberative position 
consider the individual 
as active, contrasting 
their stance with traditional one-to-many 
broadcasting media like television and 
newspapers, where the individual can 
only take information in. He then defines 
‘the interaction component of audience’ 
as referring ‘to the ‘traditional’ processes 
of signification and interpretation that are 
triggered by media consumption’ and more 
broadly explains this to mean engagement 
‘with the media texts that are offered to 
them’.8 
Both sides of the discussion, the liberal-
individualist as well as the deliberative, 
are prone to wishful thinking. To support 
their ideas, they presuppose the average 
citizen as active, willing but previously un-
able to better inform themselves. However, 
even if the internet expands the possibili-
ties to do so, it is not as if the possibili-
ties that existed before were completely 
exhausted and in dire need of expansion. 
The internet is a pull technology, as op-
The internet is 
a pull technology, 
as opposed to push 
technologies 
like television 
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posed to push technologies like television 
which do all the selecting and filtering, 
and send it out regardlessly. This is seen 
as a benefit to democracy by digital opti-
mists, but it could just as easily be an ac-
tual disadvantage. If people do not actively 
seek out political topics on the internet, 
and they also stop watching television and 
reading newspapers, they will be even less 
informed than before. Indeed, as we will 
see in the next section, political web sites 
are not even close to being amongst the 
most popular ones online.
Technological determinism might be at 
hand here, but the root of the problem lies 
deeper. As Lax notes,
the problem is a lack of political 
accountability. If electors have 
little control over decision-making 
once they have voted their politi-
cians into government, they are 
unlikely to get very excited about 
the formal political process. With-
out some means of ensuring that 
collective decisions will result in 
political action, there is no reason 
to imagine that electors are any 
more likely to participate in politi-
cal debate on computer networks 
than they are currently to vote or 
write to their representatives.9 
Even if people do turn out to be more 
eager to look for information online, there 
is the problem of veracity. The Web 2.0 
revolution that gave everyone a voice is a 
double-edged sword. There will be many 
opinions available online. Moreover, it is 
the algorithms of search engines, social 
networks and news aggregators that will 
decide what opinions will be most easily 
found, and veracity—to name one critical 
element—is not a part of the algorithm 
(because it cannot be computed). This  
issue will return in a later section.
Everybody’s talking,  
but who’s listening?
On October the 27th, 2009, Intelligence 
Squared held a debate in which prominent 
people from within the news industry 
argued over the motion ‘Good riddance, 
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mainstream media.’ The argument was 
formulated as follows:
The democratisation of news, in 
an unfiltered internet to which 
all bloggers and news aggrega-
tors have equal access, is a good 
thing. It encourages a diversity 
of voices, competing to provide 
information and analysis.
In his conclusive remark, panellist David 
Carr, journalist for the New York Times, 
arguing against the motion, first held up 
a print-out of the front page from popular 
news aggregator Newser. He pointed out 
that Newser was an 
interesting site and 
recommended people 
to visit it. Then he held 
up another print-out 
where he had cut out 
all the news articles 
of that front page that 
had come from main-
stream media. Hardly 
anything remained.
There are now so 
many voices on the 
internet, there is now 
so much data gener-
ated, that far more is 
produced than can be 
actually appreciated. 
Only a small selection 
will make it to public attention, and that 
small selection still primarily comes from 
mainstream sources. Just because these 
new voices, these so-called ‘produsers’  
are there, does not mean anyone is  
reading them. Are they not just trees fall-
ing in a forest where no one wanders,  
not making a sound? The empirical  
evidence quoted in this section will argue 
strongly against both the liberal-individ-
ualist and the deliberative democratic 
positions outlined above, not so much in 
theory as in practice.
In The Myth of Digital Democracy, 
Hindman analysed the traffic of various 
political and news websites and blogs 
and reached various interesting conclu-
sions. First of all, he finds that of the top 
100 most frequently visited websites, not 
one can be considered political. In fact, 
he finds that among all web traffic, politi-
cal sites have a share of less than 0.1%. 
In April 2007, he found the Huffington 
Post ranked 796th and FreeRepublic 




perhaps, is the large 
share which the top 
ten sites consistently 
have through all  
Hindman’s data. One 
of the arguments in 
favour of the internet 
was that it would al-
low more voices to be 
heard, that it would 
be less concentrated 
than traditional media. 
This doesn’t show in 
the statistics. In fact, 
the top 10 websites in 
general, as well as the top 10 news and 
media web sites, have a larger audience 
share than the top 10 radio stations and 
newspaper outlets (respectively 26% and 
29% versus 9% and 19%). Even when the 
same newspapers online and in print are 
compared, online audience is substantially 
more concentrated (the top 10 holding 
42%) than print (30%).11 The data of this 
experiment were replicated and confirmed 
The top 10 websites 
in general and 
the top 10 
news and media 
websites,  
have a larger audience 
share than the 
top 10 radio stations
 and newspaper 
outlets 
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by Pitts.12 Similarly, Wired reports that ‘the 
top 10 Websites accounted for 31 percent 
of US page views in 2001, 40 percent in 
2006, and about 75 percent in 2010’.13 
This argument of large online giants 
has been countered 
by the concept of the 
long-tail, popular-
ised by Anderson. 
The long-tail theory 
suggests that the 
internet is particu-
larly suited for niche 
markets, where if 
you make a small 
number of sales 
many times, you can 
still be successful. 
While this might be 
true for commodity 
markets, Anderson’s claim that ‘all those 
niches can potentially add up to a market 
that is as big as (if not bigger than) the 
hits’ simply does not match the data pro-
vided above.14 There is a tail, it is just not 
as long as Anderson claims.15 
Instead of a long-tail, Hindman argues 
that we are dealing with a ‘missing mid-
dle’. He thereby opposes Benkler’s view 
that the internet allows more ‘moderately 
read outlets’ to find an audience.16 Though 
it is true that the very small websites have 
gotten a (slight) boost from the internet 
when compared to newspaper concentra-
tion,17 they have been eating from the 
plate of the middle class, not the elites. 
Lanier comes to a similar conclusion, 
when he points out that the Web is a star-
system or winners-take-all paradigm, and 
that this will eradicate the middle class.18 
The effect of the internet on political 
engagement and participation has been 
widely researched, but unfortunately a 
clear research paradigm and methodology 
is absent. In most cases, a more liberal-
individualist reading of participation was 
used (including civic (more general,  
non-political) engagement and petition-
ing). Even then, a 
positive correlation 
was hardly found 
(nor was a negative 
one, as has also been 
predicted by some 
scholars).19 
One of the prob-
lems here is that two 
of the participatory 
affordances of the 
internet outlined 
above, the delib-
erative aspect that 
includes voicing an 
opinion and discussing it, and the broad-
casting aspect that gives every one of these 
opinions a potential audience of millions 
of people, are generally conflated. Deliber-
ative democracy, almost by its nature, can 
only work in small groups, where every 
voice is listened to and reasoned with, 
where less vocal people are still able to get 
themselves heard. Perhaps the affordance 
of the internet is many-to-many, but as the 
statistics show, the reality is few-to-few: 
few people participate, and even fewer 
people listen to them. This confusion is 
also clear in the online media’s affection 
for the term ‘user’. Carpentier explains:
Arguably, the notion of the 
user became popular because 
of its capacity to emphasise 
online audience activity, where 
people were seen to ‘use’ media 
technologies and content more 
actively. This semantic process 
only emphasised the passive 
The Internet is 
particularly 
suited for niche markets, 
where if you make 
a small number of sales 
many times,
 you can still be 
successful
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connotations of the signifier 
audience by creating a distinction 
between the signifiers audience 
and user, but at the same time 
problematically privileged online 
media worlds (and their (prod)
users) as sites of audience activ-
ity. But paradoxically, when user, 
producer and audience become 
conflated, the user-component 
dominates the chain of equiva-
lence, articulating all audiences 
as active participants; rendering 
passive consumption either ab-
sent or regrettable. Moreover, the 
lack of attention for the reception 
of online content leads to the 
presupposition that this content 
is appreciated and considered 
relevant by its audiences (in the 
assumption that the content is 
even ever discovered).20 
There is, indeed, a lack of attention for 
news reception with regard to the internet, 
which, as we have seen, might be related 
to that parenthesised final comment of 
Carpentier. There might be no attention 
for it simply because there is hardly any 
feedback to be had.21 
There is also, still, a digital divide. 
Initially, this term was used to point to 
differences in access to new technolo-
gies across different social groups. If the 
internet were to truly democratise, people 
from every strata and demographic should 
be involved. While many of the divides 
signified in the past—gender, race, age, 
education—are gradually closing (though 
they are still significant), as of 2010 there 
was still, for example, an enormous gap 
between the number of households with 
access to internet in developed (66%) and 
underdeveloped (16%) countries.22 
So the digital divide has not disap-
peared, but in as far as access to internet 
has become more equal, the problem of 
the digital divide has mostly shifted in 
nature from access to skills—or what is 
sometimes called digital literacy—and 
patterns of usage. Age and education 
were found to be important contributors 
to skill levels in performing certain tasks 
on the internet,23 men were found to be 
more politically active online than women, 
and more affluent people more politically 
active than the less affluent.24 In the same 
study, the same differences were found in 
willingness to become politically active in 
the next year, with those above 60 also  
significantly more willing than their 
younger peers.
In analyses of the producers of online 
content, we find a perpetuation of the elite 
classes instead of a more diverse group. 
Education, class and the ‘information 
environment’ greatly influences people’s 
likelihood to blog or contribute online.25 
Moreover, Hindman finds that of the most 
popular blogs, nearly all were run by 
‘either educational elites, business elites, 
technical elites, or traditional journalists.’26 
Many other studies also confirm digital 
divide effects in online content creation.27
Disintermediation
We have seen that an extension or 
improvement of democracy by digital 
technologies requires, under both of the 
popular definitions of democracy, active 
‘users’ of the internet, either interacting 
with representatives or discussing preva-
lent issues amongst each other. We have 
also seen that the internet’s many-to-many 
affordance is at this point not much more 
than a theoretical possibility. We will now 
Beyond Boundaries       117
see why, as we look at the evolving struc-
ture of the internet that can explain the 
research results discussed above.
Contrary to popular belief, the structure 
of the internet as it is now is not egalitar-
ian, and it is not (being) disintermedi-
ated. ‘The rise of 
networking did not 
eliminate interme-
diaries, but rather 
changed who they 
are’.28 The tradi-
tional gatekeepers, 
the publisher and 
the editor, have 
been replaced by 
new ones, the very 
Web 2.0 services 
that appeared to 
facilitate democratisation. While meth-
ods of quality assessment between the 
traditional and modern gatekeepers differ, 
they both function in effectively the same 
way: they decide what will and will not 
gain attention. Just because the latter uses 
an algorithm does not mean it is more fair 
or more democratic, or serves an objective 
truth.
Large companies like Amazon, Google, 
Yahoo! and Microsoft, as the Web has 
progressed over the last two decades, 
have together moved more and more into 
a system of oligopoly.29 Just these four 
companies, in the Alexa top 100 most 
visited websites of August, 2013, owned 35 
of the 100 domains listed.30 In this sense, 
the Web is nothing new.The introduction 
of new technologies in the past has often 
featured a brief unrestrained period—akin 
to the incunabula period of books—before 
crystallizing into a fixed pattern. Similarly, 
other, non-technological, industries have 
moved and are still moving more and more 
into oligopolies.
As Lawrence Lessig wrote, ‘code is the 
law’ meaning that the architecture of the 
services that we use shapes our behaviour 
and nudges us towards certain predes-





reached a point 
where they want to 
try to solve public 
problems without 
having to explain 
or justify them-
selves to citizens.’32 
While Web 2.0 
gave everyone the 
tools to raise their voice, it is done only 
through these intermediary technologies. 
Like all technologies before them, these 
empowering tools have their own biases, 
their own blind spots. They are effectively 
mediums, and often enough they are the 
message.  
In 1994, Nicholas Negroponte wrote, excit-
edly: ‘The medium is not the message in 
a digital world. It is an embodiment of it. 
A message might have several embodi-
ments automatically derivable from the 
same data’.33 Certainly, this is a possibility 
of the Web. But services that store most of 
our data, like Google and Facebook, offer 
us access to data only, data that does not 
come to us in raw form but rather in the 
specific form in which the services want 
us to access it. Lanier elaborates on this:
Individual pages as they first ap-
peared in the early 1990s had the 
flavor of personhood. MySpace 
preserved some of that flavour, 
though a process of regularised 
The traditional gatekeepers, 
the publisher and the editor, 
have been replaced
 by new ones,  
the very Web 2.0 services 
that appeared  
to facilitate democratisation 
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formatting had begun. Facebook 
went further, organizing people 
into multiple-choice identities, 
while Wikipedia seeks to erase 
point of view entirely.34 
Web 2.0 services are by definition a 
double-edged sword: they make 
publication and interaction on the internet 
easier and more accessible, and they do 
this by doing a lot of the work. By doing 
a lot of the work they make implicit 
decisions for the user.
Google’s PageRank algorithm, for 
instance, creates what has been termed 
a ‘googlearchy’, an online infrastructure 
where the number of incoming links, not 
the content, is the predominant factor for 
visibility. Since most people using search 
engines do not browse past the first page 
of search results, this results in a vicious 
cycle, the winner-takes-all effect that was 
described before. Other search engines, 
though claiming to use different cues, 
were found to produce predominantly 
similar results. PageRank has essentially 
turned the internet into a free market, 
where those with the largest influence and 
resources come out on top.35 
This is a curious instance of technologi-
cal determinism. PageRank uses quantity, 
not quality, at least in part because quality 
is not computable. If quality is in fact the 
desired variable, it has to be defined by 
proxy, and that proxy has become the 
variable of inbound links. Google defines 
a link as a vote from one site for the other. 
Like in politics, a vote cannot necessar-
ily be bought, but participants with more 
money, and therefore more visibility, have 
better chances. Making matters even worse 
is Google’s apparent shift to a ‘shareholder 
democracy’36 where the votes of more 
influential websites are allotted more 
weight.37 This again mirrors the political 
situation off the web, where, at least in the 
United States, ‘wealthy interests play an 
outsized role in the election’. 
A more recent development is person-
alisation. In recent years, probably due 
to the vast growth of information gener-
ated online, many websites have started 
offering users individual search results, 
book recommendations and news updates. 
While such a feature can certainly be 
useful, the problem is its non-optionality 
in the majority of the cases. There is no 
objective search result in Google given a 
certain query at a certain time. Location 
and user information (at the least) affect 
the results considerably. Search results are 
hidden from users, and it is not clear on 
what exact grounds this happens. This is 
a new, impersonal (and at the same time 
highly personal) method of censorship 
in the same way that PageRank is a new 
method of gatekeeping and, again, its algo-
rithmic nature does not necessarily make 
it more democratic or objective.
Moreover, a personalised internet can 
greatly harm democracy, both the liberal-
individualist and, especially, the delibera-
tive interpretation. This is related to the 
concept of the public sphere touched upon 
in the first section. In a personalised envi-
ronment, all groups of people that coalesce 
on the internet will be increasingly homo-
geneous, and discussion and deliberation 
will be reduced to yea-saying. This is what 
Pariser has dubbed the ‘filter bubble’.39 
Even without such algorithmic per-
sonalisation, filter bubble effects already 
occur. Both Sunstein and Hindman found, 
in analysing political blogs, that ‘liberals 
link mostly to liberals and conservatives 
link mostly to conservatives’.40 What this 
means is that once someone is on a web-
Beyond Boundaries       119
site supporting a certain view, he will most 
likely remain on such websites for the rest 
of the session. Combined with a search 
engine which after guessing your view on 
something returns only websites support-
ing that view, this is a very powerful pola-
rising effect, since groups tend to become 
more extreme when 
dissent and appraisal 
of alternatives are 
suppressed.41 While 
this polarisation is 
often understood in 
terms of audience 
fragmentation, this 
is not necessarily the 
case. As we saw in 
the second section, 
online audiences are 
even more concen-
trated than offline 
audiences. What is 
more likely, then, is 
that audiences will 
become more  
segregated, that the 
common public sphere will multiply in a 
few largely unconnected public spheres, 
divided by ideological borders and inter-
nally strengthened by the popular ‘sharing’ 
features of social media.
The idea behind personalisation is, 
ostensibly, to help users find what they are 
looking for. The assumption, then, is that 
people are always looking for something. 
But this is just one out of two methods of 
research. The other is browsing. It is no 
accident that we use ‘browsers’ to navigate 
the Web: this was the dominant mode in 
the early years. The very idea of hypertext 
serves itself perfectly to browsing. It brings 
order to vast amounts of information and 
allows for semantic paths to step through 
them. However, somewhere along the way, 
the ‘search’ mode has come to dominate 
the ‘browse’ mode. Now, ‘the vast digital 
library is there to help you answer the 
question with which you began’. The 
concept of ‘distant reading’ (or ‘not read-
ing’), in digital humanities, is related. 
This method, though 
useful, is only meant 
to corroborate an idea 
that was already there 
from the start. It will 
skim over the irrelevant 
(new) parts. Pariser 
speaks of a ‘shift from 
a discovery-oriented 
Web to a search-and-
retrieval focused Web’.43 
He points out that this 
is a problem not just 
for politics, but also for 
science and arts. Some 
degree of serendipity— 
an element of random 
chance—is necessary, 
he argues, to spur  
creativity and come to new ideas.
To sum up, personalisation, by only 
preaching to the choir, so to speak, will 
help crystallise society into their multiple 
public spheres, into partisan factions. Web 
2.0 services, while giving their users a 
voice, have the power to shape and manip-
ulate this voice. Digital profiles of people 
reduce them to information, and ‘informa-
tion underrepresents reality’.44 Finally, the 
plurality of voices that the advent of the 
internet announced, apart from being fil-
tered by personalisation algorithms, is also 
reduced by search engine algorithms, with 
a bias towards elite and resourceful people 
and organisations, just as it was before  
the internet.
All groups of people  
that coalesce on 
the Internet 
will be increasingly 
homogeneous, 
and discussion and 
deliberation 
will be reduced 
to yea-saying
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Conclusion
The two popular ‘positions’ of democracy 
described in the first section both depend 
on active, wilful ‘users’ of the internet. 
This has been shown to be overly optimis-
tic. Moreover, insofar as citizens are will-
ing to actively look for data, their quest is 
complicated by the changing structure of 
the web, which promotes targeted search 
over exploratory browsing, and hides 
from them the very sources most likely to 
expand their views. The research cited in 
section two confirms that this plurality of 
voices is not heard, and that democracy, 
at least in the nature and variety of the 
information people consult, has not been 
substantially altered by the digital revolu-
tion. In fact, the multiplied public sphere 
that personalisation algorithms are creat-
ing might actually harm instead of benefit 
democracy, especially a deliberative one. 
Research on the digital divide, as well 
as considerations on the ‘Googlearchy’, 
question the idea of the Web’s being more 
egalitarian. In general, opaque algorithmic 
regulation has replaced traditional power 
structures with structures that are also 
biased, albeit in different ways. Whether 
these algorithms will provoke democratic 
change in the future and in what way 
remains unanswered, but under pres-
ent conditions there is no good reason to 
believe so. n
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